Where\u27s the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation by Ghosh, Shubha
Touro Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 4 Article 7 
March 2016 
Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the 
Visible Hand of Norm Creation 
Shubha Ghosh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Consumer Protection 
Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Judges Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Profession 
Commons, Legal Writing and Research Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ghosh, Shubha (2016) "Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?: Reflections on the Visible Hand of 
Norm Creation," Touro Law Review: Vol. 16 : No. 4 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss4/7 
This Common Sense and Contracts Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
WHERE'S THE SENSE IN HILL V.
GATEWAY 2000?: REFLECTIONS ON THE
VISIBLE HAND OF NORM CREATION
Shubha Ghosh'
I. INTRODUCTORY BACKGROUND ON THE THEORY
OF NORMS
If an economist were asked what it means for something
to be commonsensical, her answer may appeal to some notion of
what is rational. A commonsensical act is one that a rational
person would do. But what is rational will often depend upon the
context against which decisions are made and judged.
Rationality does not exist in a vacuum. What is commonsensical,
what is rational will depend upon the host of legal institutions
within which actors, whether consumers or merchants or judges,
perform. How do economists understand legal institutions? My
analysis of Judge Easterbrook's decision in Hill v. Gateway
20003 illustrates an emerging focus on law and economic analysis
of legal institutions: the theory of norms and norm creation.4
Associate Professor, Georgia State; B.A., 1984, Amherst Coll.; M.A.,
1988; Ph.D., 1988, Michigan; J.D., 1994, Stanford. Articles Editor, Stan. L.
& Pol'y Rev. Admitted: CA, 1998. Assistant Professor, Department of
Economics, University of Texas, 1988-91; Clerk, Hon. John T. Noonan, U.S.
Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, San Francisco, 1994-95; Associate, Baker &
McKenzie, San Francisco, 1995-96; Assistant Professor, Oklahoma City,
1996-98; Associate Professor, Georgia State, since 1998. Visiting Professor,
SUNY at Buffalo, Fall 2000 to present.
2 See Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law
and Psycholegal Research, 5 U. CHi. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 137-42
(1998) (laying out a model for common-sense psychology as applied to the
study of legal institutions).
3 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
4 See generally Symposiun: Law, Economics & Norms 144 U. PA. L. REv.
1643-2339 (1996), see also Symposiwn: The Nature and Sources, Formal and
Informal, of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 947-1242 (1997) (providing an
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Traditionally, economists analyzing legal institutions have
focused on two principal mechanisms through which law
functions: a centralized command mechanism and a decentralized
property rights mechanism. 5
The command mechanism is what many non-experts in
law and economics might immediately associate with the purpose
of law. If the legislature, for example, decides that automobiles
should move at fifty-five miles per hour and no more, the
legislature passes a statute commanding such an outcome with the
appropriate sanction if violators are caught. From an economic
perspective, what the legislature is doing is placing a price on
speeding. Those who are willing to speed will do so if they are
willing to pay the price associated with the sanction,
appropriately discounted for the probability of getting caught.
The price of speeding will also affect the types of evasive
measures that potential speeders would take. For example, a
radar detector could reduce the probability of getting caught
while speeding and hence reduce the price of speeding. A
potential speeder would only buy the detector if its price were
less than or equal to the reduction in the price of speeding. A
command mechanism is a centralized one; its contours are
defined by the legislature. A command mechanism also operates
like a tax, affecting the price of undertaking the regulated
conduct.
A property rights mechanism is a less intuitively obvious
method by which law functions. Under a property rights
mechanism, a statute or a judicial decision creates a rule which is
designed to define a right held by an individual or a group. The
rule defines a right in two ways. First, the rule determines what
the individual holding the right is entitled to do or refrain from
doing. Second, the rule defines what the remedy is if the right is
infringed upon by someone else. The structure of a property
rights mechanism can be complicated. A property rights
5 See, ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 2-4 (1991) (discussing
Coase's property rights approach to dispute resolution); see also Robert
Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 947, 950-53
(1997) (discussing centralization and decentralization in law making).
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mechanism protects two rights: the right of drivers to speed and
the right of other people to be compensated for accidents that
result from speeding. In the example of preventing speeding, the
rule under a property rights mechanism could be structured as
follows: all drivers have the right to go as fast as they want, but a
driver who causes an accident because of his speeding is liable
for the resulting damages to the injured party. Such a rule would
have some effect on the behavior of drivers; whether it results in
less speeding or more is an empirical question which will depend
upon, (a) how individual drivers respond to the rule, and (b) how
in the aggregate the drivers' individual decisions would interact.
There are some very salient distinctions between the
command mechanism and the property rights mechanism. The
property rights mechanism does not require a definition of
speeding ex ante, while the command mechanism does. Instead,
the determination of what constitutes 'speeding' occurs after an
accident has occurred and takes place either in a court of law or
through some form of alternative dispute resolution.
Furthermore, enforcement is party-driven under a property rights
mechanism, while a command mechanism requires centralized
authority to police individual behavior. For these two reasons, a
property rights mechanism is a decentralized mechanism, while a
command mechanism is a centralized one.
The two mechanisms, however, suffer from several
common deficiencies. Both require extensive information
gathering to be effective. The command mechanism requires
extensive information about the conduct to be regulated in order
to set out the rule and the sanction ex ante. The property rights
mechanism also requires extensive information although it would
be collected by parties after an accident occurs. The information
costs make each approach potentially difficult to implement.
However, even if the information costs were low, both
mechanisms also lack a degree of realism to make them effective
or palatable. In the example of speeding that I have been
discussing, it may very well be the case that a person chooses not
to speed because an internal conscience says not to speed.
Alternatively, a person may speed because regardless of the price
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accepted and going slow is frowned upon. Individual conduct
may be driven by these internal and external forces, and the role
of law is irrelevant from the perspective of either commanding a
result or defining a right. People behave not in the shadow of the
law, but outside its penumbra. Human behavior and human law
are independent.
Recently, many law and economic scholars have
recognized the importance of conscience and social forces in
dictating human behavior and the role of the law. This
recognition stems in part from the limits of the command and the
property rights mechanisms discussed here. Another impetus is
increased dissatisfaction with the rational actor model that both
these mechanisms presume. Individual rationality, the notion that
humans act based on the cost-benefit calculations, cannot explain
social problems that stem from addictive behavior or explain such
phenomena as voting, political campaigning, or the use of the
courts to assure civil liberties. Conscience and social forces need
to be appealed to in order to better understand observed conduct.
Furthermore, individual rationality often can justify what many
may describe as social pathology, a reluctance to change the
status quo or to organize in groups and form human societies.
Hence, law and economics scholars have turned to the
study of norms. A norm is an informal rule that dictates when a
person is obligated to act or not to act in a certain way. The
doffing of hats in a church, to take an example from Professor
Robert Cooter, is a norm.6 Even if a man is inclined to keep the
hat on in the church (for example, because the temperature in the
church is too low), a man still removes the hat because society
dictates. A norm may be so internalized that one's conscience
automatically responds causing the individual to feel guilty if the
norm is not followed. Norms serve as a mechanism, in addition
to that of command and property rights, to shape conduct.
In the context of speeding, lawmakers can control
speeding by promoting the norm of good and safe driving, for
example, by showing that they take safe driving seriously through
deliberating its virtues and passing a law that punishes speeding.
6 Cooter, supra note 5, at 954.
7 Cooter, supra note 5, at 953-54.
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The force of the law is not in affecting the price of speeding or in
defining rights, but in symbolically communicating to the public
that speeding should be avoided.
This capsule summary of the various mechanisms by
which law functions, as analyzed by economists, serves as
background for the focus of this paper, my contribution to the
symposium on Hill v. Gateway 2000.8 As I explain in detail in
Section Two, Judge Easterbrook's appeal to "sense" is an appeal
to norms. What the Judge is doing is seeding or creating a norm
that will govern individual conduct in contractual transactions.
He is not commanding a result or even defining property rights.
Instead, he is symbolically communicating what the norm should
be for consumers when they purchase items over the phone.
More broadly, given his reliance on ProCD v. Zeidenberg,9 a
prior decision authored by Judge Easterbrook, the Judge is
seeding a norm for property definition over databases and other
new technologies. The sense to Hill v. Gateway 2000 rests on
the normative structure the Judge envisions and wishes to impose
on contractual transactions. In Section Two, I unravel this
normative structure by discussing the Judge's opinion. I explain
how the Judge uses the word "sense" in Section Three. In
Section Four, I demonstrate how the Judge's use of the word
"sense" can be understood within the language of the theory of
norms, drawing on the work of Robert Ellickson. Section Five
summarizes and concludes.
II. AN UPHILL BATTLE AGAINST GATEWAY 2000: THE
FACTS AND RESULT OF THE CASE
Rich and Enza Hill ordered a computer from Gateway
2000 over the phone. The computer arrived in a box which also
contained an invoice with a list of terms, including warranties
and a thirty-day return policy. The critical term was one
requiring arbitration to settle any disputes with the vendor
company. Thirty-plus days later a dispute arose, and the Hills
8 105 F.3d 1147.
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sued in federal court.10 Gateway 2000 was unsuccessful in
dismissing the suit by enforcing the arbitration clause because the
court found that "the present record is insufficient to support a
finding of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties or
that the [Hills] were given adequate notice of the arbitration
clause." 1 The Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored
by Judge Easterbrook, ruled in favor of the company and
reversed the district court.12 The following language from the
Judge's opinion best expresses the spirit of the opinion: "A
contract need not be read to be effective; people who accept take
the risk that the unread terms may in retrospect prove
unwelcome." 13
The Court of Appeals relied largely on its prior precedent
established by ProCD v. Zeidenberg14 in reaching its result. The
ProCD case concerned the enforcement of a "shrink-wrap
license," that is, a license contained in a box of software that the
consumer was aware of only after purchasing the software and
opening the box.15 The court in ProCD held that the contract
was enforceable. 16 In describing ProCD as controlling authority
in the Hills' case, the court did not mention that the issue in
ProCD was not the enforcement of an arbitration clause, but the
enforcement of a term that made the information on the software
proprietary to the creator of the software. This result is
controversial because the information on the software was a
database, a list of names and addresses, and the Supreme Court
has held that such databases could not be protected under federal
copyright law. 17 The decision in ProCD is important not only
'0 1996 WL 650631 (N.D. 11. Nov. 7, 1996).
" Id. at 1147-48.
12 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
13 Id. at 1148.
14 86 F.3d 1447.
" Id. at 1449.
16 id.
17 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Ser. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,
360 (1991) (holding that the taking of raw data such as names, addresses,
towns, and telephone numbers from a telephone book was not a violation of
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because of its holding that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable,
but also because of its holding that contract law is not pre-empted
by copyright law and can be used to create proprietary rights
over databases.18 I mention these additional facts because they
help explain in part why Judge Easterbrook is so insistent that
ProCD controls.
The Hills, of course, argued otherwise, arguing that
ProCD is distinguishable. Their first argument is that ProCD is
a software case and therefore inapplicable to an ordinary
consumer transaction over the phone.' 9 It is this argument that
the Judge dismisses as lacking sense. I will focus on this point in
the next section, but it is first important to clarify the Hills'
remaining three arguments.
The Hills also attempted to distinguish ProCD on the
ground that the contract at issue was a license and hence an
executory contract.20 In contrast, the contract between the Hills
and Gateway 2000 was fully performed when the computer was
delivered to their home.21 The court rejects this view, finding
that the Hill-Gateway 2000 contract also included terms which
implied an ongoing performance obligation, such as the
warranties, which were promises by Gateway to cure defects.
22
Therefore, both the ProCD contract and the Hill-Gateway 2000
contract were executory and the two cases could not be
distinguished on those grounds.
The court was equally skeptical of the Hills' argument
based on Uniform Commercial Code.Section 2-207 ("U.C.C.").
According to the Hills, the phone order constituted the offer and
the shipment of the goods with the new and different terms, the
acceptance.23 The contract was formed as soon as the goods
were shipped. The new and different terms included in the box
could not become part of the contract because the transaction was
between a merchant (Gateway 2000) and a non-merchant (the
18 ProCD, 86 F.3d 1454-55.
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Hills). Under UCC § 2-207(2), the terms of the offer (here set
by the Hills) govern, and the new and different terms drop out.
The court held that UCC § 2-207 did not apply because there was
only one form and therefore a battle of the forms problem did not
24exist.
Finally, the Hills appealed to their lack of notice of the
additional terms to explain the terms' unenforceability.2 5  The
court rejected this argument as well, stating that the Hills, based
either on advertisements or ordinary experience with
transactions, should have known that additional terms were
26forthcoming. The court points to three ways in which
additional terms enter into a contract: inquiry of vendor, public
documents and advertisements, and notice of the terms followed
by a thirty-day return policy. 27 The third way applied to the
Hills' case. Failure to return the computer within thirty-days
constituted acceptance of the additional terms.
What is the court, or more specifically Judge
Easterbrook, doing in this opinion? One thing that is clear is that
he is reconstituting the manner in which the contract was formed.
According to the Hills, the contract was formed as follows: the
phone order was the offer, the shipment the acceptance.
29
According to the Judge, however, the shipment was the offer, the
failure to return was the acceptance. 30 The offer was made on
the day the computer arrived and the acceptance occurred on the
thirty-first day that the Hills kept the c.omputer. 31 Under U.C.C.
§ 2-206(1):
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or the circumstances (a) an offer to make
a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance
24 Id. at 1150 (citing ProCD for the proposition that UCC § 2-207 does not





29 Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 1150.
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in any manner and by any medium reasonable in
the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt
or current shipment shall be construed as inviting
acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or
by the prompt or current shipment of conforming
or non-conforming goods .... 32
The language of U.C.C. § 2-206 is in the Hills' favor, but
the language is never discussed in the opinion. Furthermore, the
additional terms included with the computer are subject to
analysis under U.C.C. §2-207, which states, in relevant part, that
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance... operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional or different from
those offered or agreed upon ....
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as
proposals for addition to the contract. Between
merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless...
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognize the
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a
contract for sale although the writings of the
parties do not otherwise establish a contract.
33
Under sub-section one, the additional terms do not
undermine the fact that shipment constituted acceptance. These
additional terms, under sub-section two, are proposals for
addition to the contract. If the contract were between merchants,
these terms would automatically would become part of the
contract unless one of the three exceptions apply. I omit the
exceptions here because the Hills were not merchants. The
question is what happens under U.C.C. § 2-207 to the additional
terms when one of the parties is not a merchant? Under sub-
section § 2-207(2), if the parties are not both merchants, then the
32 u.c.c. § 2-206 (1993).
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additional terms drop out of the contract and do not become part
of the agreement. Application of U.C.C. sections 2-206 and 2-
207 would weigh in favor of the Hills' position. Even though
Judge Easterbrook concludes that § 2-207 is inapplicable because
the provision governs the situation when there are two opposing
forms from the offeror and the offeree, not one as in the Gateway
2000 case, this view has been expressly rejected. As the U.S.
District Court for Kansas recently stated in a case involving
Gateway:
[T]he Seventh Circuit concluded without support
that UCC § 2-207 was irrelevant because the cases
involved only one written form .... This
conclusion is not supported by the statute ....
Disputes under § 2-207 often arise in the context
of a 'battle of forms,' but nothing in its language
precludes application in a case which involves only
one form.34
Where legal analysis fails to illuminate Judge
Easterbrook's reasoning, economic analysis provides an answer.
However, characterizing the Judge's approach either as
application of a command mechanism or a property right
mechanism would miss the heart of the opinion. The Judge is not
commanding an outcome to be enforced by monetary or other
sanctions. Nor is he creating a property right over which the
parties could bargain. In affirming ProCD, the Judge is
affirming a norm that allows the parties to create property rights
through contract. Judge Easterbrook concludes that the
arbitration clause is enforceable because the Hills agreed to it. In
light of his insistence on relying on ProCD and his appeal to
"sense," the Judge's approach can best be described as one of
seeding norms having to do with contractual transactions,
especially the norms involving the provision of information. An
analysis of how Judge Easterbrook uses the word "sense" will
bolster my interpretation.
34 Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338 (D. Kan. 2000),
(citations omitted) disntissed 2000 WL 1372886 (D. Kan. Sept. 6, 2000).
[Vol 161134
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I. HOW JUDGE EASTERBROOK USES THE WORD
SENSE
What is intriguing about the opinion is Judge
Easterbrook's subverting of what is natural and traditional in
contract law. Rejecting traditional unilateral contract principles
and U.C.C. § 2-207 analysis, the Judge is touting the novel
precedent of ProCD as the correct way of viewing the contract
between the Hills and Gateway. The Judge's use of the word
"sense," 35 implying common sense, is the foundation for this
rhetorical move. The Hills argued that ProCD be limited to the
treatment of softvare license.36 The Judge rejects this argument
as lacking sense:
Plaintiffs ask us to limit ProCD to software, but
where's the sense in that? [1] Pro-CD is about the
law of contract, not the law of softvare. [2]
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is
common for air transportation, insurance, and
many other endeavors. [3] Practical
considerations support allowing vendors to enclose
the fall legal terms with their products. Cashiers
cannot be expected to read legal documents to
customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at
the other end of the photie for direct-sales
operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-
page statement of terms before taking the buyer's
credit card number, the droning voice would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the
waste of their time. And oral recitation would not
avoid customers' assertions (whether true or
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to
them, or that they did not remember or understand
it. [4] Writing provides benefits for both sides of
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commercial transactions. Customers as a group
are better off when vendors skip costly and
ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and
use instead a simple approve-or-return device.
Competent adults are bound by such documents,
read or unread. [5] For what little it is worth, we
add that the box from Gateway was crammed with
software. The computer came with an operating
system, without which it was useful only as a boat
anchor. Gateway also included many application
programs. So the Hills' effort to limit Pro-CD to
software would not avail them factually, even if it
were sound legally-which it is not.37
The word sense is used in the following five ways in this
paragraph:
Sense as generalization
The Judge states that ProCD is about the law of contract,
not the law of software. 38 Contract, meaning the law governing
agreements and promises, is the correct level of generalization.
There are no special rules governing software licenses as distinct
from other agreements. However, the Judge ignores the point
that ProCD is as much about copyright law as it is about contract
law. The central holding in ProCD is that copyright law does not
pre-empt contract law, and therefore a creator can protect his
interest in a database not protected by copyright law through the
use of contract terms .39 A more appropriate generalization is that
ProCD is about the law of intellectual property and hence
irrelevant to the facts of Gateway 2000.
37 Id. at 1149 (citations omitted) [numbering added].
38 Id.
39 Pro CD, 86 F.3d at 1455.
1136 [Vol 16
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Sense as empirical consistency
The Judge states that arbitration clauses, much like that at
issue in Hill v. Gateway 2000, are common in air transportation,
insurance, and "many other endeavors." 40 With this argument,
the Judge turns from the general to the specific. The appeal is no
longer to some uniform, governing law of contract, but to
specific types of contract with which the Hills presumably have
experience. The Judge seems to be making the point that a
general body of law is based on empirical consistency and
enforceability of the term in one context would require
enforceability in other contexts. However, the level of generality
is not clear here. There are ways in which air transportation and
insurance differ from shrink-wrap licenses for software sold over
the Internet or from contracts for computers sold over the phone.
If the general rule is that arbitration clauses that are discovered
after payment as part of an "approve-or-return" method of
acceptance are always enforceable as a matter of contract law,
what is the point of referring to the many endeavors in which the
clauses arises? The Judge, by providing an empirical basis for
the law of contract, is grounding the legal rule of enforceability
in actual practice and empirically verifiable outcomes.
Sense as practicability
Here, the Judge seemingly invokes the Hand formula.4'
The costs of disclosing all the terms over the phone outweigh any
benefits, at least as the Judge measures and balances the
respective costs and benefits. He ignores the costs and benefits
of disclosing the arbitration clause and the "approve-or-return"
policy, the offensive terms at issue in this case. The Judge sees
the requirement of full disclosure as potentially shutting down the
40 Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
41 Id. at 1149 (referring to the Hand formula in a commercial context. The
Hand formula was articulated by Judge Learned Hand and is used to determine
the "burden of precaution that is warranted by calculating probability of injury
times gravity of harm," Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata
Corp., 848 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Carroll Towing
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market for phone order computers if full disclosure were strictly
followed.42  This argument misses several points. First, the
practicability of full disclosure rests on the mechanism of
contract formation. If the contract were formed upon delivery of
the merchandise, the burden would shift to Gateway to disclose
all terms before delivery. Since contract formation is
characterized as occurring when the Hills failed to return the
merchandise, there is no incentive for prior disclosure of the
terms. As a practical matter, which is closer to how consumers
may view a contract formation? A consumer buying what
economists call an "experience good," 4 3 would expect that the
good can be easily returned upon discovery of the defect. If I
discover that the milk I bought is in fact sour, then I can go back
to the grocery store and complain. It would seem to defy sense if
the milk manufacturer or the grocer attached a tag to the cap
which said that all disputes over the quality of the milk are to be
arbitrated in Geneva.
There are two practical issues that the Judge ignores. The
first is the length of time that is necessary to discover whether the
experience good meets the customer's expectations. A thirty-day
period may not be adequate to discover all the possible defects
that can afflict a computer. The second practical issue is one of
remedy and redress. The combination of the arbitration clause
and the approve-or-return policy creates a knife-edge situation.
If the defect is discovered on the thirty-first day, the cost of
redressing the defect is quite high. If the defect is discovered a
day earlier, the cost of redress is shipping the product back. The
effect of enforcing both the arbitration clause and the approve-or-
return policy is to protect companies that sell products with latent
defects which are difficult to detect. Although reputational
markets and norms may counter this incentive, practical reasons
42 Id. at 1149.
43 Experience goods are goods for which consumers can not make valuations
of their characteristics and quality prior to purchase. Franklin J. Mixon,
Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods: The Impact of Product Price
and Consumer Search Costs on Seller-Provided Informational Cues, 31
APPLIED ECONOMICS at 331 (1999).
1138 [Vol 16
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for allowing each term separately do not add up to enforcing both
terms together.
Sense as efficiency enhancing
The Judge reasons that customers are made better off by
the approve-or return policy.44 There is no elaboration on how
these benefits arise except in reducing the costs to the vendor or
engaging in what the Judge characterizes as long and ineffective
recitation of terms.45 Presumably, these costs are passed on to
the consumer. Furthermore, the Judge discusses how competent
adults are bound by terms, whether they are read or not.46 There
is an analogy with market exchange that is being made in this
discussion. If I pay X dollars for a product, there is a
presumption that I value the product at X dollars or more. The
consent principle in contract is a proxy for the efficiency of the
contract. The Judge is expanding the consent principle quite a bit
here and is engaging in part in propter hoc reasoning. His logic
can be described as follows: approve-or-return benefits
consumers. Therefore, consenting to approve-or-return policies
would promote efficiency. Since these terms arose from an
approve-or-return policy, the terms must be efficient and
enforced. However, there is a presumption of consent in this
reasoning. There is an even stronger assumption that since
consent implies efficiency, the efficiency of terms would imply
that a customer would consent to them. This last point is
specious not only because of the confusion of necessary and
sufficient conditions, but also because it is not clear what is the
basis for determining that certain terms are efficient, other than
the court's ipse dixit.
Sense as precedent
The Judge's last interpretation of sense comes full circle
to the question of generalization. While the Judge begins by
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stating that ProCD is about contract, not software,47 he ends by
stating that even if ProCD were about software, the facts of the
Hills' case implicate software and therefore ProCD should apply
a fortiori.48 Here, we witness a typical argument by precedent.
The Judge is not denying that the precedent of ProCD applies at a
high level of generality; he is stating that there is no distinction
between that case and the case at hand. Of course, by concluding
that the two cases are the same, the judge ignores the differences,
the principal one being the difference between enforcing a shrink-
wrap license and the enforcing terms that are subject to an
approve-or-return policy. The question we are left with is: what
is the sense in ignoring that distinction?
The Judge uses "sense" in five different ways in his
opinion. The first and the fifth ways can be described as
'process based' definitions that look to case interpretation and
precedent in gauging the sense of treating ProCD as the
applicable precedent. The second way can be described as an
appeal to empiricism. An act is commonsensical if it is similar to
acts in other contexts. The third and fourth ways are appeals to
practicality and economic efficiency. Something is
commonsensical if it generates positive net benefits or
efficiencies.
In characterizing the Hills' argument as non-sensical, the
Judge is affirming several legal and market based norms. The
first is the norm of judicial craftsmanship and common law rule
making through precedent. The Judge, by appealing to
precedent, is asserting its naturalness as the only way of
determining a particular legal issue. Of course, the Judge also
overlooks the many ways he has to sidestep precedent to reach
the result. The second norm is that of practice. The best
measure of the right thing to do is determining what others have
done in similar situations. The norm is similar to that of judicial
craftsmanship and precedent in that it aims at consistency. But
while the first norm focuses squarely on judicial practice, the
second focuses on practice in the marketplace and in the
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relevant marketplace and community? The Judge refers to air
transport and insurance and "other endeavors" 49 without a
careful parsing of the differences among the various
representative markets or communities. The third norm is that of
wealth-maximization or utilitarianism. I use the two terms
interchangeably here, even though they are very different, to
reflect the Judge's conflation of these two approaches under the
general umbrella of efficiency.
Why is the Judge affirming these norms? These norms
reflect a pro-Freedom of Contract position. His choice of
examples and reasoning reflect his feeling that Gateway should
win either way because the Judge is pro-business inherently or
pro-technology. The choice of norms also illustrates an attempt
to decentralize norm creation. Future rules governing these
transactions will be determined by contract terms that can be
dictated by Gateway or other sellers. Courts should defer to
what companies define to be the practice regarding consumer
transactions.
IV. CREATING CONTRACT NORMS AFTER PRoCD
Professor Ellickson develops a theory of controller-
selecting norms, that is, norms governing the mechanisms of
social control. 50  He lists five possible mechanisms: the self,
express contract, informal social forces, hierarchy, and the
state. 51  Controller-selecting norms .are the meta-norms that
allocate the goal of social control among these five mechanisms.
The Gateway 2000 case also illustrates controller-selecting
norms. The specific norm it illustrates is that of judicial decision
making as the meta-norm that allocates social control among
express contract, the state, and the self. All of these mechanisms
of social control interact in the Gateway 2000 case. The Judge's
opinion delegates control to the business entity in designing the
terms of the contract, which must be internalized by the customer
in his dealing with the business entity.
49 Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d at 1149.
50 Ellickson, supra note 5, at 240-64.
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My analysis of the case raises some of the issues analyzed
by Robert Cooter in his theory of social obligations. Professor
Cooter points out that norms are subject to lock-in and tipping
effects.52 His point is that there are switching costs to norms but
once these are overcome, a superior norm can lead to tipping to a
different norm.53 The role of regulation, according to Professor
Cooter, is to affect switching costs and tipping. 54  Judge
Easterbrook's opinion raises the switching costs of norms and
inhibits tipping. By adopting a pro-business stance to norm
creation, Judge Easterbrook allows businesses like Gateway to
dictate the terms of consumer transactions. Because of switching
costs, such pro-business norms are likely to persist. By
enforcing arbitration clauses such as the one at issue in the
Gateway 2000 case, Judge Easterbrook effectively raises the
switching costs and makes tipping difficult, if not impossible.
Since courts are the primary mechanism for tipping, requiring
enforcement through arbitration makes it impossible for courts to
act. The process based norm further raises the switching costs
and makes tipping difficult. In light of statutory regulation of
warranties and arbitration terms, another way of viewing Judge
Easterbroook's opinion is as a mechanism of tipping consumer
transactions from a pro-regulatory norm to one that is
deregulatory and pro-business. In other words, Judge
Easterbrook's opinion itself illustrates the lock-in and tipping
phenomenon described by Professor Cooter.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Hill v. Gateway 200055
represents a viewpoint based on Freedom of Contract. But this
freedom, like most, does not spring naturally from the ground or
emerge, like Athena, from the mind of Zeus (or a judicial
equivalent). Freedom of Contract is a norm that is created and
52 Cooter, supra note 5, at 976-77.
53 Cooter, supra note 5, at 976-77.
54 Cooter, supra note 5, at 976-77.
55 105 F.3d 1147.
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accepted and made part and parcel of how social interactions are
viewed. The opinion offers a startling example of how the norm
of Freedom of Contract is fashioned.
Another way to characterize the Judge's approach in the
Gateway 2000 decision is 'libertarian regulation.' Though this
term is oxymoronic, it captures the fact that even libertarianism,
the principle that freedom is absolute, requires regulation for it to
function. And often this regulation is more than minimal. In an
opinion that hales56 Freedom of Contract and affirms the
ascendancy of alternative dispute resolution, Judge Easterbrook
has unsubtly demonstrated the centrality of the common law
process in creating and establishing the norms that make free
markets and Freedom of Contract possible.
56 The use of the verb "hale" is intended as a pun. The reference is to the
work of Robert Hale, who was an early law and economics scholar and legal
realist. His ideas on law and markets, especially those on the legal
foundations of freedom of contract, are carefully laid out and analyzed in a
book by Barbara Fried. PROGRESSvE ASSAULT ON LAIsSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT
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